




**M** *CBJ Law Department*  
**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Mayor and Assembly  
**From:** John W. Hartle, City Attorney   
**Subject:** Fees on Cruise Lines; Resolution 2294b.  
**Date:** March 12, 2005

You have asked for an analysis of the objections raised by Jim Reeves of Dorsey and Whitney regarding the proposed increases in cruise line fees in Resolution 2294b. I have analyzed all the cases cited by Mr. Reeves, and the other major case law as well. The short answer is that, while there is always some risk regarding particular expenditures, and federal law does provide special protection to interstate and foreign shipping, it appears that the present proposal would pass muster under the U.S. Constitution because the proposal is a fee for services and facilities that benefit the cruise industry, rather than a tax to raise general revenues.

***The Tonnage Clause.***

The Tonnage Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives the shipping industry a measure of special protection from state and local taxation. The clause provides: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage." U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, cl. 3. It was added to the Constitution on September 15, 1787, according to the notes of James Madison, essentially as a supplement to the Commerce Clause, which also serves to limit state and local regulation or taxation of interstate or foreign commerce.

Under the Tonnage Clause, a municipality cannot levy a general tax on ships for the privilege of entering port; fees for services and facilities, however, can be imposed. There are many cases that make this point. Closest to home is the July, 2004, Superior Court decision in *Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez*. Case No. 3AN-00-9665CI. In that case, the court struck down the City of Valdez's Ordinance 99-17 which imposed the "Tanker Tax," a business personal property tax levied mainly on oil tankers. Because the tax was imposed for the admitted purpose of raising general revenues, not based on a particular service or facility for the tankers, the court struck it down.

The fee increase proposed in Resolution 2294b, by contrast, is not intended as a general revenue measure. The resolution would impose fees for the purpose of constructing facilities outlined in the Long-Range Waterfront Plan that benefit the cruise industry. See Resolution 2294b, Sec. 2(e), pg. 3, line 22. Courts have consistently found that state or local fees for services or facilities do not violate the Tonnage Clause. In 1877, the U.S. Supreme Court summarized the law as follows:

To determine whether the charge prescribed by the ordinance in question is a duty of tonnage, within the meaning of the Constitution, it is necessary to observe carefully its object and essence. If the charge is clearly a duty, a tax, or burden, which in its essence is a contribution claimed for the privilege of entering the port of Keokuk, or remaining in it, or departing from it, imposed, as it is, by authority of the State, and measured by the capacity of the vessel, it is doubtless embraced by the constitutional prohibition of such a duty. *But a charge for services rendered or for conveniences provided is in no sense a tax or a duty.* It is not a hindrance or impediment to free navigation. *The prohibition to the State against the imposition of a duty of tonnage was designed to guard against local hindrances to trade and carriage by vessels, not to relieve them from liability to claims for assistance rendered and facilities furnished for trade and commerce.*

*Keokuk Northern Line Packet Co. v. City of Keokuk*, 95 U.S. 80, 84 -85 (1877) (emphasis added).

125 years later, courts are still saying the same thing:

"[A] charge for services rendered or for conveniences provided is in no sense a tax or a duty. It is not a hindrance or impediment to free navigation."); see also *Barber v. Hawai'i*, 42 F.3d 1185, 1196 (9th Cir.1994) ("[A] state is not prohibited from charging reasonable fees in return for services rendered.")...For example, a harbor fee charged for the use of restroom facilities, parking, trash disposal, and security is not a "duty of tonnage" because services are provided in exchange for the fee. See *Barber*, 42 F.3d at 1196. Similarly, if fees are for pilotage, wharfage, use of locks on a navigable river, or for medical inspection, those fees are not unconstitutional duties of tonnage. See *Clyde Mallory*, 296 U.S. at 266, 56 S.Ct. 194.

*Captain Andy's Sailing, Inc. v. Johns*, 195 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1172 (D.Hawai'i 2001).

A fee charged to ensure that emergency services are available is also not a duty of tonnage, even if not every ship paying the fee needs the service.

*New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist.*, 874 F.2d 1018, 1023 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990).

### ***The Commerce Clause.***

The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides: "The Congress shall have power . . . To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states . . ." Allocating this authority over foreign and interstate commerce to Congress means that such authority is *not* allocated to states or municipalities; the negative sweep of the Commerce Clause precludes state or local regulation. There are many cases interpreting the Commerce Clause from the earliest days of the federal courts. In the context of shipping, however, the Commerce Clause is not as restrictive as the Tonnage Clause. If a fee or practice is allowed under the Tonnage Clause, the Commerce Clause is not likely to prohibit it.

***The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.***

As a fairly recent enactment of Congress, this act has no body of developed case law interpreting it. However, from its plain language, it can be seen as the most restrictive of the three main areas of federal law restricting municipal fees on shipping interests. Although not mentioned in Mr. Reeves' memo regarding Resolution 2294b, the Maritime Security Act of 2002 provides his best argument. It provides:

- (b) No taxes, tolls, operating charges, fees, or any other impositions whatever shall be levied upon or collected from any vessel or other water craft, or from its passengers or crew, by any non-Federal interest, if the vessel or water craft is operating on any navigable waters subject to the authority of the United States, or under the right to freedom of navigation on those waters, except for
  - (1) fees charged under section 2236 of this title;
  - (2) reasonable fees charged on a fair and equitable basis that--
    - (A) are used solely to pay the cost of a service to the vessel or water craft;
    - (B) enhance the safety and efficiency of interstate and foreign commerce; and
    - (C) do not impose more than a small burden on interstate or foreign commerce; or
  - (3) property taxes on vessels or watercraft, other than vessels or watercraft that are primarily engaged in foreign commerce if those taxes are permissible under the United States Constitution.

This federal statute, among others, in my view comprises "the Consent of Congress" contemplated by the Tonnage Clause. Accordingly, if a project fits its requirements, it will pass muster under the Tonnage Clause and the Commerce Clause as well. This is the statute CBJ has been acting under since its enactment. Sponsored by Rep. Don Young, it was intended to clarify the requirements of the Commerce Clause, according to his address to Congress upon its passage:

Section 445 [the Act] addresses the current problem, and the potential for greater future problems, of local jurisdictions seeking to impose taxes and fees on vessels merely transiting or making innocent passage through navigable waters subject to the authority of the United States that are adjacent to the taxing community. We are seeing instances in which local communities are seeking to impose taxes or fees on vessels even where the vessel is not calling on, or landing, in the local community. These are cases where no passengers are disembarking, in case of passenger vessels, or no cargo is being unloaded in the case of cargo vessels and where the vessels are not stopping for the purpose of receiving any other service offered by the port. In most instances, these types of taxes would not be allowed under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Unfortunately, without a statutory clarification, the only means to determine whether the burden is an impermissible burden under the Constitution is to pursue years of litigation. . .

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Conference Report on S. 1214, Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002; Speech of Hon. Don Young, of Alaska, in the House of Representatives, Thursday, November 14, 2002.

The requirements of this federal statute appear to be straight out of the case law, particularly, the Fifth Circuit's summary of the U.S. Supreme Court *Clyde Mallory* decision. See *Plaquimines*, 874 F.2d 1018, 1021(5th Cir. 1989). One additional issue raised is that of the requirement that any fee "not impose more than a small burden on interstate or foreign commerce . . ." All indications are that the cruise industry is financially healthy at this time, and that the proposed additional one dollar per passenger could be contractually passed on to the cruise consumer, and, therefore, would not impose more than a small burden on interstate or foreign commerce.

***Conclusion.***

Resolution 2294b would increase the Port Development Fee by one dollar per passenger. Because the resolution requires that all funds collected by the Port Development Fund be spent on projects outlined in the Long-Range Waterfront Plan that benefit the cruise industry, the fee increase would very likely survive a challenge based on the case law from the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In my view, so long as CBJ continues its vigilance in following the requirements of federal law and close cooperation with the industry in making expenditures (as required by Resolution 2294b), a legal challenge would be unlikely to succeed.